15 ideas
23269 | Philosophy must start from clearly observed facts [Galen] |
22153 | Quine rejects Carnap's view that science and philosophy are distinct [Quine, by Boulter] |
10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
19485 | Names have no ontological commitment, because we can deny that they name anything [Quine] |
19486 | We can use quantification for commitment to unnameable things like the real numbers [Quine] |
23266 | The spirit in the soul wants freedom, power and honour [Galen] |
23219 | Stopping the heart doesn't terminate activity; pressing the brain does that [Galen, by Cobb] |
23264 | Philosophers think faculties are in substances, and invent a faculty for every activity [Galen] |
23220 | The brain contains memory and reason, and is the source of sensation and decision [Galen] |
23265 | The rational part of the soul is the desire for truth, understanding and recollection [Galen] |
10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |
19487 | Without the analytic/synthetic distinction, Carnap's ontology/empirical distinction collapses [Quine] |
23268 | We execute irredeemable people, to protect ourselves, as a deterrent, and ending a bad life [Galen] |