13 ideas
| 10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
| 10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
| 10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
| 7401 | Heat and colour don't exist, so cannot mislead about the external world [Galileo, by Tuck] |
| 5454 | Tastes, odours and colours only reside in consciousness, and would disappear with creatures [Galileo] |
| 16560 | Galileo introduced geometrico-mechanical explanation, based on Archimedes [Galileo, by Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
| 10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |
| 6387 | A minimum requirement for a theory of meaning is that it include an account of truth [Davidson] |
| 6391 | A theory of truth tells us how communication by language is possible [Davidson] |
| 6388 | Is reference the key place where language and the world meet? [Davidson] |
| 6390 | With a holistic approach, we can give up reference in empirical theories of language [Davidson] |
| 6389 | To explain the reference of a name, you must explain its sentence-role, so reference can't be defined nonlinguistically [Davidson] |
| 3645 | To understand the universe mathematics is essential [Galileo] |