10 ideas
| 10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
| 10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
| 10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
| 8463 | Maths can be reduced to logic and set theory [Quine] |
| 8698 | Modal structuralism says mathematics studies possible structures, which may or may not be actualised [Hellman, by Friend] |
| 9557 | Statements of pure mathematics are elliptical for a sort of modal conditional [Hellman, by Chihara] |
| 10263 | Modal structuralism can only judge possibility by 'possible' models [Shapiro on Hellman] |
| 8461 | The category of objects incorporates the old distinction of substances and their modes [Quine] |
| 8462 | A hallucination can, like an ague, be identified with its host; the ontology is physical, the idiom mental [Quine] |
| 10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |