37 ideas
15053 | If metaphysics can't be settled, it hardly matters whether it makes sense [Fine,K] |
15054 | 'Quietist' says abandon metaphysics because answers are unattainable (as in Kant's noumenon) [Fine,K] |
21032 | Speak truth only to those who deserve the truth [Sandel] |
21033 | Careful evasions of truth at least show respect for it [Sandel] |
15007 | If you make 'grounding' fundamental, you have to mention some non-fundamental notions [Sider on Fine,K] |
15006 | Something is grounded when it holds, and is explained, and necessitated by something else [Fine,K, by Sider] |
15055 | Grounding relations are best expressed as relations between sentences [Fine,K] |
15050 | Reduction might be producing a sentence which gets closer to the logical form [Fine,K] |
15051 | Reduction might be semantic, where a reduced sentence is understood through its reduction [Fine,K] |
15052 | Reduction is modal, if the reductions necessarily entail the truth of the target sentence [Fine,K] |
15056 | The notion of reduction (unlike that of 'ground') implies the unreality of what is reduced [Fine,K] |
15060 | Why should what is explanatorily basic be therefore more real? [Fine,K] |
15046 | Reality is a primitive metaphysical concept, which cannot be understood in other terms [Fine,K] |
15047 | What is real can only be settled in terms of 'ground' [Fine,K] |
15048 | In metaphysics, reality is regarded as either 'factual', or as 'fundamental' [Fine,K] |
15061 | Although colour depends on us, we can describe the world that way if it picks out fundamentals [Fine,K] |
15059 | Grounding is an explanation of truth, and needs all the virtues of good explanations [Fine,K] |
15057 | Ultimate explanations are in 'grounds', which account for other truths, which hold in virtue of the grounding [Fine,K] |
15058 | A proposition ingredient is 'essential' if changing it would change the truth-value [Fine,K] |
21036 | Not all deals are fair deals [Sandel] |
21038 | Does consent create the obligation, or must there be some benefit? [Sandel] |
21039 | Moral contracts involve both consent and reciprocity; making the deal, and keeping it [Sandel] |
21030 | The categorical imperative is not the Golden Rule, which concerns contingent desires [Sandel] |
21031 | Man cannot dispose of himself, because he is not a thing to be owned [Sandel] |
21035 | Just visiting (and using roads) is hardly ratifying the Constitution [Sandel] |
21037 | A ratified constitution may not be a just constitution [Sandel] |
21034 | A just constitution harmonises the different freedoms [Sandel] |
21049 | Liberal freedom was a response to assigned destinies like caste and class [Sandel] |
21040 | Libertarians just want formal equality in a free market; the meritocratic view wants fair equality [Sandel] |
21043 | Distributive justice concern deserts, as well as who gets what [Sandel] |
21028 | We can approach justice through welfare, or freedom, or virtue [Sandel] |
21027 | Justice concerns how a society distributes what it prizes - wealth, rights, power and honours [Sandel] |
21042 | Should we redress wrongs done by a previous generation? [Sandel] |
21048 | Work is not fair if it is negotiated, even in a fair situation, but if it suits the nature of the worker [Sandel] |
21052 | Justice is about how we value things, and not just about distributions [Sandel] |
21045 | Teleological thinking is essential for social and political issues [Sandel] |
12702 | Causes can be inferred from perfect knowledge of their effects [Leibniz] |