11 ideas
| 10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
| 13157 | Choose the true hypothesis, which is the most intelligible one [Leibniz] |
| 10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
| 10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
| 13158 | The Copernican theory is right because it is the only one offering a good explanation [Leibniz] |
| 10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |
| 4125 | Hare says I acquire an agglomeration of preferences by role-reversal, leading to utilitarianism [Hare, by Williams,B] |
| 4126 | If we have to want the preferences of the many, we have to abandon our own deeply-held views [Williams,B on Hare] |
| 4127 | If morality is to be built on identification with the preferences of others, I must agree with their errors [Williams,B on Hare] |
| 22483 | A judgement is presciptive if we expect it to be acted on [Hare] |
| 4360 | By far the easiest way of seeming upright is to be upright [Hare] |