Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Guide to Ground', 'Logicism and Ontological Commits. of Arithmetic' and 'Of the First Principles of Government'

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33 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
17275 Realist metaphysics concerns what is real; naive metaphysics concerns natures of things [Fine,K]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
17282 Truths need not always have their source in what exists [Fine,K]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 7. Making Modal Truths
17283 If the truth-making relation is modal, then modal truths will be grounded in anything [Fine,K]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
10017 Truth in a model is more tractable than the general notion of truth [Hodes]
10018 Truth is quite different in interpreted set theory and in the skeleton of its language [Hodes]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
10015 Higher-order logic may be unintelligible, but it isn't set theory [Hodes]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
17286 Logical consequence is verification by a possible world within a truth-set [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
10011 Identity is a level one relation with a second-order definition [Hodes]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
10016 When an 'interpretation' creates a model based on truth, this doesn't include Fregean 'sense' [Hodes]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
10027 Mathematics is higher-order modal logic [Hodes]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / f. Arithmetic
10026 Arithmetic must allow for the possibility of only a finite total of objects [Hodes]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
10021 It is claimed that numbers are objects which essentially represent cardinality quantifiers [Hodes]
10022 Numerical terms can't really stand for quantifiers, because that would make them first-level [Hodes]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
17272 2+2=4 is necessary if it is snowing, but not true in virtue of the fact that it is snowing [Fine,K]
17276 If you say one thing causes another, that leaves open that the 'other' has its own distinct reality [Fine,K]
17284 An immediate ground is the next lower level, which gives the concept of a hierarchy [Fine,K]
17285 'Strict' ground moves down the explanations, but 'weak' ground can move sideways [Fine,K]
17288 We learn grounding from what is grounded, not what does the grounding [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
17281 If grounding is a relation it must be between entities of the same type, preferably between facts [Fine,K]
17280 Ground is best understood as a sentence operator, rather than a relation between predicates [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation
17290 Only metaphysical grounding must be explained by essence [Fine,K]
17274 Philosophical explanation is largely by ground (just as cause is used in science) [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / d. Grounding and reduction
17278 We can only explain how a reduction is possible if we accept the concept of ground [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Fictionalism
10023 Talk of mirror images is 'encoded fictions' about real facts [Hodes]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
17287 Facts, such as redness and roundness of a ball, can be 'fused' into one fact [Fine,K]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
17279 Even a three-dimensionalist might identify temporal parts, in their thinking [Fine,K]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
17273 Each basic modality has its 'own' explanatory relation [Fine,K]
17289 Every necessary truth is grounded in the nature of something [Fine,K]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
17291 We explain by identity (what it is), or by truth (how things are) [Fine,K]
17271 Is there metaphysical explanation (as well as causal), involving a constitutive form of determination? [Fine,K]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
17277 If mind supervenes on the physical, it may also explain the physical (and not vice versa) [Fine,K]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
21094 There are two kinds of right - to power, and to property [Hume]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
21095 It is an exaggeration to say that property is the foundation of all government [Hume]