Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Ontological Dependence', 'Quodlibeta' and 'Reference and Essence (1st edn)'

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22 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / c. Philosophy as generalisation
We understand things through their dependency relations [Fine,K]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics deals with the existence of things and with the nature of things [Fine,K]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
Maybe two objects might require simultaneous real definitions, as with two simultaneous terms [Fine,K]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 11. Ostensive Definition
Ostensive definitions needn't involve pointing, but must refer to something specific [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
S4, and therefore S5, are invalid for metaphysical modality [Salmon,N, by Williamson]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / b. Being and existence
An object's 'being' isn't existence; there's more to an object than existence, and its nature doesn't include existence [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
There is 'weak' dependence in one definition, and 'strong' dependence in all the definitions [Fine,K]
A natural modal account of dependence says x depends on y if y must exist when x does [Fine,K]
An object depends on another if the second cannot be eliminated from the first's definition [Fine,K]
Dependency is the real counterpart of one term defining another [Fine,K]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
Substance, Quantity and Quality are real; other categories depend on those three [Henry of Ghent]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
The only reality in the category of Relation is things from another category [Henry of Ghent]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
Accidents are diminished beings, because they are dispositions of substance (unqualified being) [Henry of Ghent]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
We should understand identity in terms of the propositions it renders true [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
How do we distinguish basic from derived esssences? [Fine,K]
Maybe some things have essential relationships as well as essential properties [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
An object only essentially has a property if that property follows from every definition of the object [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
Essentialism says some properties must be possessed, if a thing is to exist [Salmon,N]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
Kant says things-in-themselves cause sensations, but then makes causation transcendental! [Henry of Ghent, by Pinkard]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
Frege's 'sense' solves four tricky puzzles [Salmon,N]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
The perfect case of direct reference is a variable which has been assigned a value [Salmon,N]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 5. Reference to Natural Kinds
Nothing in the direct theory of reference blocks anti-essentialism; water structure might have been different [Salmon,N]