57 ideas
21955 | My dogmatic slumber was first interrupted by David Hume [Kant] |
9208 | Philosophers with a new concept are like children with a new toy [Fine,K] |
16931 | Metaphysics is generating a priori knowledge by intuition and concepts, leading to the synthetic [Kant] |
17275 | Realist metaphysics concerns what is real; naive metaphysics concerns natures of things [Fine,K] |
17282 | Truths need not always have their source in what exists [Fine,K] |
17283 | If the truth-making relation is modal, then modal truths will be grounded in anything [Fine,K] |
17286 | Logical consequence is verification by a possible world within a truth-set [Fine,K] |
16918 | Mathematics cannot proceed just by the analysis of concepts [Kant] |
16930 | Geometry is not analytic, because a line's being 'straight' is a quality [Kant] |
16919 | Geometry rests on our intuition of space [Kant] |
16920 | Numbers are formed by addition of units in time [Kant] |
16929 | 7+5 = 12 is not analytic, because no analysis of 7+5 will reveal the concept of 12 [Kant] |
16910 | Mathematics can only start from an a priori intuition which is not empirical but pure [Kant] |
16917 | All necessary mathematical judgements are based on intuitions of space and time [Kant] |
16928 | Mathematics cannot be empirical because it is necessary, and that has to be a priori [Kant] |
17272 | 2+2=4 is necessary if it is snowing, but not true in virtue of the fact that it is snowing [Fine,K] |
17276 | If you say one thing causes another, that leaves open that the 'other' has its own distinct reality [Fine,K] |
17284 | An immediate ground is the next lower level, which gives the concept of a hierarchy [Fine,K] |
17285 | 'Strict' ground moves down the explanations, but 'weak' ground can move sideways [Fine,K] |
17288 | We learn grounding from what is grounded, not what does the grounding [Fine,K] |
17281 | If grounding is a relation it must be between entities of the same type, preferably between facts [Fine,K] |
17280 | Ground is best understood as a sentence operator, rather than a relation between predicates [Fine,K] |
17290 | Only metaphysical grounding must be explained by essence [Fine,K] |
17274 | Philosophical explanation is largely by ground (just as cause is used in science) [Fine,K] |
17278 | We can only explain how a reduction is possible if we accept the concept of ground [Fine,K] |
9210 | Possible objects are abstract; actual concrete objects are possible; so abstract/concrete are compatible [Fine,K] |
9211 | A non-standard realism, with no privileged standpoint, might challenge its absoluteness or coherence [Fine,K] |
17287 | Facts, such as redness and roundness of a ball, can be 'fused' into one fact [Fine,K] |
9202 | Objects, as well as sentences, can have logical form [Fine,K] |
11833 | The substance, once the predicates are removed, remains unknown to us [Kant] |
9206 | We must distinguish between the identity or essence of an object, and its necessary features [Fine,K] |
17279 | Even a three-dimensionalist might identify temporal parts, in their thinking [Fine,K] |
9205 | The three basic types of necessity are metaphysical, natural and normative [Fine,K] |
9209 | Metaphysical necessity may be 'whatever the circumstance', or 'regardless of circumstances' [Fine,K] |
9200 | Empiricists suspect modal notions: either it happens or it doesn't; it is just regularities. [Fine,K] |
17273 | Each basic modality has its 'own' explanatory relation [Fine,K] |
17289 | Every necessary truth is grounded in the nature of something [Fine,K] |
21957 | 'Transcendental' concerns how we know, rather than what we know [Kant] |
16923 | I admit there are bodies outside us [Kant] |
21441 | 'Transcendental' is not beyond experience, but a prerequisite of experience [Kant] |
16916 | A priori synthetic knowledge is only of appearances, not of things in themselves [Kant] |
16915 | A priori intuitions can only concern the objects of our senses [Kant] |
16914 | A priori intuition of objects is only possible by containing the form of my sensibility [Kant] |
21447 | I can make no sense of the red experience being similar to the quality in the object [Kant] |
16924 | I count the primary features of things (as well as the secondary ones) as mere appearances [Kant] |
16913 | I can't intuit a present thing in itself, because the properties can't enter my representations [Kant] |
16925 | Appearance gives truth, as long as it is only used within experience [Kant] |
16911 | Intuition is a representation that depends on the presence of the object [Kant] |
17291 | We explain by identity (what it is), or by truth (how things are) [Fine,K] |
17271 | Is there metaphysical explanation (as well as causal), involving a constitutive form of determination? [Fine,K] |
17277 | If mind supervenes on the physical, it may also explain the physical (and not vice versa) [Fine,K] |
16912 | Some concepts can be made a priori, which are general thoughts of objects, like quantity or cause [Kant] |
9207 | If sentence content is all worlds where it is true, all necessary truths have the same content! [Fine,K] |
16926 | Analytic judgements say clearly what was in the concept of the subject [Kant] |
16927 | Analytic judgement rests on contradiction, since the predicate cannot be denied of the subject [Kant] |
16922 | Space must have three dimensions, because only three lines can meet at right angles [Kant] |
16921 | If all empirical sensation of bodies is removed, space and time are still left [Kant] |