9 ideas
10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
14235 | Saying 'they can become a set' is a tautology, because reference to 'they' implies a collection [Cargile] |
10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
22179 | Explanatory facts also predict, and predictive facts also explain [Hempel, by Okasha] |
6755 | For Hempel, explanations are deductive-nomological or probabilistic-statistical [Hempel, by Bird] |
17083 | The covering-law model is for scientific explanation; historical explanation is quite different [Hempel] |
13052 | Hempel rejects causation as part of explanation [Hempel, by Salmon] |
10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |