33 ideas
21584 | A sense of timelessness is essential to wisdom [Russell] |
2516 | Most of philosophy begins where science leaves off [Katz] |
2510 | Traditionally philosophy is an a priori enquiry into general truths about reality [Katz] |
21572 | Philosophical disputes are mostly hopeless, because philosophers don't understand each other [Russell] |
21571 | Philosophical systems are interesting, but we now need a more objective scientific philosophy [Russell] |
21574 | Hegel's confusions over 'is' show how vast systems can be built on simple errors [Russell] |
21587 | Philosophers sometimes neglect truth and distort facts to attain a nice system [Russell] |
21582 | Physicists accept particles, points and instants, while pretending they don't do metaphysics [Russell] |
21573 | When problems are analysed properly, they are either logical, or not philosophical at all [Russell] |
21588 | Logic gives the method of research in philosophy [Russell] |
21586 | The logical connectives are not objects, but are formal, and need a context [Russell] |
21585 | The tortoise won't win, because infinite instants don't compose an infinitely long time [Russell] |
2521 | 'Real' maths objects have no causal role, no determinate reference, and no abstract/concrete distinction [Katz] |
21684 | Atomic facts may be inferrable from others, but never from non-atomic facts [Russell] |
22316 | A positive and negative fact have the same constituents; their difference is primitive [Russell] |
21576 | With asymmetrical relations (before/after) the reduction to properties is impossible [Russell] |
21575 | When we attribute a common quality to a group, we can forget the quality and just talk of the group [Russell] |
9216 | Each area of enquiry, and its source, has its own distinctive type of necessity [Fine,K] |
21580 | Science condemns sense-data and accepts matter, but a logical construction must link them [Russell] |
2513 | We don't have a clear enough sense of meaning to pronounce some sentences meaningless or just analytic [Katz] |
21583 | When sense-data change, there must be indistinguishable sense-data in the process [Russell] |
21577 | Empirical truths are particular, so general truths need an a priori input of generality [Russell] |
2522 | Experience cannot teach us why maths and logic are necessary [Katz] |
21579 | Objects are treated as real when they connect with other experiences in a normal way [Russell] |
9214 | Unsupported testimony may still be believable [Fine,K] |
21578 | Global scepticism is irrefutable, but can't replace our other beliefs, and just makes us hesitate [Russell] |
6416 | Other minds seem to exist, because their testimony supports realism about the world [Russell, by Grayling] |
2517 | Structuralists see meaning behaviouristically, and Chomsky says nothing about it [Katz] |
2519 | It is generally accepted that sense is defined as the determiner of reference [Katz] |
2520 | Sense determines meaning and synonymy, not referential properties like denotation and truth [Katz] |
2518 | Sentences are abstract types (like musical scores), not individual tokens [Katz] |
9215 | Causation is easier to disrupt than logic, so metaphysics is part of nature, not vice versa [Fine,K] |
21581 | We never experience times, but only succession of events [Russell] |