Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction'', 'Concepts:where cogn.science went wrong' and 'The Structure of Paradoxes of Self-Reference'

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24 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
We have no successful definitions, because they all use indefinable words [Fodor]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox
Typically, paradoxes are dealt with by dividing them into two groups, but the division is wrong [Priest,G]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / b. König's paradox
The 'least indefinable ordinal' is defined by that very phrase [Priest,G]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / c. Berry's paradox
'x is a natural number definable in less than 19 words' leads to contradiction [Priest,G]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / d. Richard's paradox
By diagonalization we can define a real number that isn't in the definable set of reals [Priest,G]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / c. Burali-Forti's paradox
The least ordinal greater than the set of all ordinals is both one of them and not one of them [Priest,G]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / e. Mirimanoff's paradox
The next set up in the hierarchy of sets seems to be both a member and not a member of it [Priest,G]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
If you know that a sentence is not one of the known sentences, you know its truth [Priest,G]
There are Liar Pairs, and Liar Chains, which fit the same pattern as the basic Liar [Priest,G]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / d. Hume's Principle
If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K]
Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
If 'exist' is ambiguous in 'chairs and numbers exist', that mirrors the difference between chairs and numbers [Fodor]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
Empiricists use dispositions reductively, as 'possibility of sensation' or 'possibility of experimental result' [Fodor]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
Associationism can't explain how truth is preserved [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas
Mental representations are the old 'Ideas', but without images [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
Fodor is now less keen on the innateness of concepts [Fodor, by Lowe]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / a. Concepts as representations
It is essential to the concept CAT that it be satisfied by cats [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
I prefer psychological atomism - that concepts are independent of epistemic capacities [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
Definable concepts have constituents, which are necessary, individuate them, and demonstrate possession [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / d. Concepts as prototypes
Many concepts lack prototypes, and complex prototypes aren't built from simple ones [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
The theory theory can't actually tell us what concepts are [Fodor]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
English has no semantic theory, just associations between sentences and thoughts [Fodor]