10 ideas
10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
13168 | My formal unifying atoms are substantial forms, which are forces like appetites [Leibniz] |
13169 | I call Aristotle's entelechies 'primitive forces', which originate activity [Leibniz] |
13170 | The analysis of things leads to atoms of substance, which found both composition and action [Leibniz] |
13171 | Substance must necessarily involve progress and change [Leibniz] |
10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |
18681 | The base for values has grounds, catalysts and intensifiers [Dancy,J, by Orsi] |
13167 | We need the metaphysical notion of force to explain mechanics, and not just extended mass [Leibniz] |