Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Things and Their Parts', 'An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev)' and 'Apriority as an Evaluative Notion'

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47 ideas

2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 4. Circularity
Maybe reasonableness requires circular justifications - that is one coherentist view [Field,H]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Part and whole contribute asymmetrically to one another, so must differ [Fine,K]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
Hierarchical set membership models objects better than the subset or aggregate relations do [Fine,K]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
The matter is a relatively unstructured version of the object, like a set without membership structure [Fine,K]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
A 'temporary' part is a part at one time, but may not be at another, like a carburetor [Fine,K]
A 'timeless' part just is a part, not a part at some time; some atoms are timeless parts of a water molecule [Fine,K]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
An 'aggregative' sum is spread in time, and exists whenever a component exists [Fine,K]
An 'compound' sum is not spread in time, and only exists when all the components exists [Fine,K]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
Two sorts of whole have 'rigid embodiment' (timeless parts) or 'variable embodiment' (temporary parts) [Fine,K]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
Lots of propositions are default reasonable, but the a priori ones are empirically indefeasible [Field,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 7. A Priori from Convention
We treat basic rules as if they were indefeasible and a priori, with no interest in counter-evidence [Field,H]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
Reliability only makes a rule reasonable if we place a value on the truth produced by reliable processes [Field,H]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
Believing nothing, or only logical truths, is very reliable, but we want a lot more than that [Field,H]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
People vary in their epistemological standards, and none of them is 'correct' [Field,H]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
If we only use induction to assess induction, it is empirically indefeasible, and hence a priori [Field,H]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / b. The natural life
Human beings can never really flourish in a long-term state of nature [Wolff,J]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
Collective rationality is individuals doing their best, assuming others all do the same [Wolff,J]
Should love be the first virtue of a society, as it is of the family? [Wolff,J]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
For utilitarians, consent to the state is irrelevant, if it produces more happiness [Wolff,J]
Social contract theory has the attracton of including everyone, and being voluntary [Wolff,J]
Maybe voting in elections is a grant of legitimacy to the winners [Wolff,J]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
We can see the 'general will' as what is in the general interest [Wolff,J]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / c. Despotism
How can dictators advance the interests of the people, if they don't consult them about interests? [Wolff,J]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / a. Government
'Separation of powers' allows legislative, executive and judicial functions to monitor one another [Wolff,J]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 1. Ideology
Political choice can be by utility, or maximin, or maximax [Wolff,J]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 2. Anarchism
A realistic and less utopian anarchism looks increasingly like liberal democracy [Wolff,J]
It is hard for anarchists to deny that we need experts [Wolff,J]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 4. Social Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism probably implies a free market plus welfare [Wolff,J]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
A system of democracy which includes both freedom and equality is almost impossible [Wolff,J]
Democracy expresses equal respect (which explains why criminals forfeit the vote) [Wolff,J]
Democracy has been seen as consistent with many types of inequality [Wolff,J]
A true democracy could not tolerate slavery, exploitation or colonialism [Wolff,J]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / b. Consultation
We should decide whether voting is for self-interests, or for the common good [Wolff,J]
Condorcet proved that sensible voting leads to an emphatically right answer [Wolff,J]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / e. Democratic minorities
Occasional defeat is acceptable, but a minority that is continually defeated is a problem [Wolff,J]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 4. Free market
Market prices indicate shortages and gluts, and where the profits are to be made [Wolff,J]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Liberty principles can't justify laws against duelling, incest between siblings and euthanasia [Wolff,J]
Either Difference allows unequal liberty, or Liberty makes implementing Difference impossible [Wolff,J]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Utilitarians argue for equal distribution because of diminishing utility of repetition [Wolff,J]
Difference Principle: all inequalities should be in favour of the disadvantaged [Wolff,J]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 2. Political equality
Political equality is not much use without social equality [Wolff,J]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Standard rights: life, free speech, assembly, movement, vote, stand (plus shelter, food, health?) [Wolff,J]
If natural rights are axiomatic, there is then no way we can defend them [Wolff,J]
If rights are natural, rather than inferred, how do we know which rights we have? [Wolff,J]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
Utilitarians might say property ownership encourages the best use of the land [Wolff,J]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
Rights and justice are only the last resorts of a society, something to fall back on [Wolff,J]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / d. Legal positivism
Following some laws is not a moral matter; trivial traffic rules, for example [Wolff,J]