14 ideas
| 18859 | Metaphysics is a quest for truthmakers [Tallant] |
| 10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
| 18861 | Maybe number statements can be paraphrased into quantifications plus identities [Tallant] |
| 18866 | Maybe only 'positive' truths need truth-makers [Tallant] |
| 18860 | A truthmaker is the minimal portion of reality that will do the job [Tallant] |
| 18863 | What is the truthmaker for a possible new power? [Tallant] |
| 10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
| 10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
| 20752 | For man, being is not what he is, but what he is going to be [Ortega y Gassett] |
| 18864 | The wisdom of Plato and of Socrates are not the same property [Tallant] |
| 18865 | Substance must have two properties: individuation, and property-bearing [Tallant] |
| 10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |
| 18862 | Are propositions all the thoughts and sentences that are possible? [Tallant] |
| 20756 | Instead of having a nature, man only has a history [Ortega y Gassett] |