48 ideas
| 10468 | A metaphysics has an ontology (objects) and an ideology (expressed ideas about them) [Oliver] |
| 10471 | Ockham's Razor has more content if it says believe only in what is causal [Oliver] |
| 9143 | Implicit definitions must be satisfiable, creative definitions introduce things, contextual definitions build on things [Fine,K, by Cook/Ebert] |
| 10143 | 'Creative definitions' do not presuppose the existence of the objects defined [Fine,K] |
| 10749 | Necessary truths seem to all have the same truth-maker [Oliver] |
| 10750 | Slingshot Argument: seems to prove that all sentences have the same truth-maker [Oliver] |
| 10145 | Abstracts cannot be identified with sets [Fine,K] |
| 10136 | Points in Euclidean space are abstract objects, but not introduced by abstraction [Fine,K] |
| 10144 | Postulationism says avoid abstract objects by giving procedures that produce truth [Fine,K] |
| 10747 | Accepting properties by ontological commitment tells you very little about them [Oliver] |
| 10748 | Reference is not the only way for a predicate to have ontological commitment [Oliver] |
| 10721 | If properties are sui generis, are they abstract or concrete? [Oliver] |
| 10719 | There are four conditions defining the relations between particulars and properties [Oliver] |
| 10716 | There are just as many properties as the laws require [Oliver] |
| 10720 | We have four options, depending whether particulars and properties are sui generis or constructions [Oliver] |
| 10714 | The expressions with properties as their meanings are predicates and abstract singular terms [Oliver] |
| 10715 | There are five main semantic theories for properties [Oliver] |
| 10739 | The property of redness is the maximal set of the tropes of exactly similar redness [Oliver] |
| 10738 | Tropes are not properties, since they can't be instantiated twice [Oliver] |
| 10740 | The orthodox view does not allow for uninstantiated tropes [Oliver] |
| 10741 | Maybe concrete particulars are mereological wholes of abstract particulars [Oliver] |
| 10742 | Tropes can overlap, and shouldn't be splittable into parts [Oliver] |
| 10472 | 'Structural universals' methane and butane are made of the same universals, carbon and hydrogen [Oliver] |
| 10724 | Located universals are wholly present in many places, and two can be in the same place [Oliver] |
| 10730 | If universals ground similarities, what about uniquely instantiated universals? [Oliver] |
| 7963 | Aristotle's instantiated universals cannot account for properties of abstract objects [Oliver] |
| 7962 | Uninstantiated properties are useful in philosophy [Oliver] |
| 10727 | Uninstantiated universals seem to exist if they themselves have properties [Oliver] |
| 10722 | Instantiation is set-membership [Oliver] |
| 10744 | Nominalism can reject abstractions, or universals, or sets [Oliver] |
| 10726 | Things can't be fusions of universals, because two things could then be one thing [Oliver] |
| 10725 | Abstract sets of universals can't be bundled to make concrete things [Oliver] |
| 10745 | Science is modally committed, to disposition, causation and law [Oliver] |
| 10746 | Conceptual priority is barely intelligible [Oliver] |
| 9144 | Fine's 'procedural postulationism' uses creative definitions, but avoids abstract ontology [Fine,K, by Cook/Ebert] |
| 10141 | Many different kinds of mathematical objects can be regarded as forms of abstraction [Fine,K] |
| 10135 | We can abstract from concepts (e.g. to number) and from objects (e.g. to direction) [Fine,K] |
| 9142 | Fine considers abstraction as reconceptualization, to produce new senses by analysing given senses [Fine,K, by Cook/Ebert] |
| 10137 | Abstractionism can be regarded as an alternative to set theory [Fine,K] |
| 10138 | An object is the abstract of a concept with respect to a relation on concepts [Fine,K] |
| 3546 | 'Phronesis' should translate as 'practical intelligence', not as prudence [Annas] |
| 3547 | Epicureans achieve pleasure through character development [Annas] |
| 3543 | Cyrenaics pursue pleasure, but don't equate it with happiness [Annas] |
| 3541 | Ancient ethics uses attractive notions, not imperatives [Annas] |
| 3550 | Principles cover life as a whole, where rules just cover actions [Annas] |
| 3551 | Virtue theory tries to explain our duties in terms of our character [Annas] |
| 3552 | If excessively good actions are admirable but not required, then duty isn't basic [Annas] |
| 3542 | We should do good when necessary, not maximise it [Annas] |