16 ideas
15527 | Defining terms either enables elimination, or shows that they don't require elimination [Lewis] |
10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
15530 | A logically determinate name names the same thing in every possible world [Lewis] |
15531 | The Ramsey sentence of a theory says that it has at least one realisation [Lewis] |
15528 | A Ramsey sentence just asserts that a theory can be realised, without saying by what [Lewis] |
15526 | There is a method for defining new scientific terms just using the terms we already understand [Lewis] |
15529 | It is better to have one realisation of a theory than many - but it may not always be possible [Lewis] |
10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |
23146 | Motives produce intentions, which lead to actions [Driver] |
23147 | Good intentions are not necessary for virtue [Driver] |
23144 | Virtue should be defined by consequences, not by states of mind [Driver] |
23148 | Virtues are character traits or dispositions which produce good consequences for others [Driver] |
23150 | Control of pregnancy and knowledge of paternity have downgraded chastity [Driver] |
23149 | If generosity systematically turned recipients into parasites, it wouldn't be a virtue [Driver] |