15 ideas
17435 | Objects do not naturally form countable units [Koslicki] |
17433 | We can still count squares, even if they overlap [Koslicki] |
17439 | There is no deep reason why we count carrots but not asparagus [Koslicki] |
17434 | We struggle to count branches and waves because our concepts lack clear boundaries [Koslicki] |
1630 | We can only see an alien language in terms of our own thought structures (e.g. physical/abstract) [Quine] |
17436 | We talk of snow as what stays the same, when it is a heap or drift or expanse [Koslicki] |
5747 | "No entity without identity" - our ontology must contain items with settled identity conditions [Quine, by Melia] |
7925 | There is no proper identity concept for properties, and it is hard to distinguish one from two [Quine] |
13387 | Our conceptual scheme becomes more powerful when we posit abstract objects [Quine] |
8277 | I prefer 'no object without identity' to Quine's 'no entity without identity' [Lowe on Quine] |
9216 | Each area of enquiry, and its source, has its own distinctive type of necessity [Fine,K] |
9214 | Unsupported testimony may still be believable [Fine,K] |
1631 | You could know the complete behavioural conditions for a foreign language, and still not know their beliefs [Quine] |
1632 | Translation of our remote past or language could be as problematic as alien languages [Quine] |
9215 | Causation is easier to disrupt than logic, so metaphysics is part of nature, not vice versa [Fine,K] |