8 ideas
10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
14963 | Surely the past phases of a thing are not parts of the thing? [Broad] |
9216 | Each area of enquiry, and its source, has its own distinctive type of necessity [Fine,K] |
9214 | Unsupported testimony may still be believable [Fine,K] |
10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |
9215 | Causation is easier to disrupt than logic, so metaphysics is part of nature, not vice versa [Fine,K] |