17 ideas
8996 | If if time is money then if time is not money then time is money then if if if time is not money... [Quine] |
10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
8995 | Definition by words is determinate but relative; fixing contexts could make it absolute [Quine] |
10064 | Quine quickly dismisses If-thenism [Quine, by Musgrave] |
20296 | Logic needs general conventions, but that needs logic to apply them to individual cases [Quine, by Rey] |
8998 | Claims that logic and mathematics are conventional are either empty, uninteresting, or false [Quine] |
8999 | Logic isn't conventional, because logic is needed to infer logic from conventions [Quine] |
9000 | If a convention cannot be communicated until after its adoption, what is its role? [Quine] |
8994 | If analytic geometry identifies figures with arithmetical relations, logicism can include geometry [Quine] |
8997 | There are four different possible conventional accounts of geometry [Quine] |
10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
8993 | If mathematics follows from definitions, then it is conventional, and part of logic [Quine] |
9216 | Each area of enquiry, and its source, has its own distinctive type of necessity [Fine,K] |
9214 | Unsupported testimony may still be believable [Fine,K] |
10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |
9215 | Causation is easier to disrupt than logic, so metaphysics is part of nature, not vice versa [Fine,K] |