43 ideas
17275 | Realist metaphysics concerns what is real; naive metaphysics concerns natures of things [Fine,K] |
6161 | Structuralism is neo-Kantian idealism, with language playing the role of categories of understanding [Rowlands] |
17892 | For clear questions posed by reason, reason can also find clear answers [Gödel] |
17282 | Truths need not always have their source in what exists [Fine,K] |
17283 | If the truth-making relation is modal, then modal truths will be grounded in anything [Fine,K] |
9188 | Gödel proved that first-order logic is complete, and second-order logic incomplete [Gödel, by Dummett] |
17286 | Logical consequence is verification by a possible world within a truth-set [Fine,K] |
6163 | If bivalence is rejected, then excluded middle must also be rejected [Rowlands] |
10620 | Originally truth was viewed with total suspicion, and only demonstrability was accepted [Gödel] |
17883 | Gödel's Theorems did not refute the claim that all good mathematical questions have answers [Gödel, by Koellner] |
17885 | Gödel eventually hoped for a generalised completeness theorem leaving nothing undecidable [Gödel, by Koellner] |
10614 | The real reason for Incompleteness in arithmetic is inability to define truth in a language [Gödel] |
17272 | 2+2=4 is necessary if it is snowing, but not true in virtue of the fact that it is snowing [Fine,K] |
17276 | If you say one thing causes another, that leaves open that the 'other' has its own distinct reality [Fine,K] |
17284 | An immediate ground is the next lower level, which gives the concept of a hierarchy [Fine,K] |
17285 | 'Strict' ground moves down the explanations, but 'weak' ground can move sideways [Fine,K] |
17288 | We learn grounding from what is grounded, not what does the grounding [Fine,K] |
17281 | If grounding is a relation it must be between entities of the same type, preferably between facts [Fine,K] |
17280 | Ground is best understood as a sentence operator, rather than a relation between predicates [Fine,K] |
17290 | Only metaphysical grounding must be explained by essence [Fine,K] |
17274 | Philosophical explanation is largely by ground (just as cause is used in science) [Fine,K] |
17278 | We can only explain how a reduction is possible if we accept the concept of ground [Fine,K] |
6155 | Supervenience is a one-way relation of dependence or determination between properties [Rowlands] |
17287 | Facts, such as redness and roundness of a ball, can be 'fused' into one fact [Fine,K] |
6154 | It is argued that wholes possess modal and counterfactual properties that parts lack [Rowlands] |
17279 | Even a three-dimensionalist might identify temporal parts, in their thinking [Fine,K] |
6157 | Tokens are dated, concrete particulars; types are their general properties or kinds [Rowlands] |
17289 | Every necessary truth is grounded in the nature of something [Fine,K] |
17273 | Each basic modality has its 'own' explanatory relation [Fine,K] |
6159 | Strong idealism is the sort of mess produced by a Cartesian separation of mind and world [Rowlands] |
17291 | We explain by identity (what it is), or by truth (how things are) [Fine,K] |
17271 | Is there metaphysical explanation (as well as causal), involving a constitutive form of determination? [Fine,K] |
6152 | Minds are rational, conscious, subjective, self-knowing, free, meaningful and self-aware [Rowlands] |
6173 | Content externalism implies that we do not have privileged access to our own minds [Rowlands] |
6174 | If someone is secretly transported to Twin Earth, others know their thoughts better than they do [Rowlands] |
17277 | If mind supervenes on the physical, it may also explain the physical (and not vice versa) [Fine,K] |
6158 | Supervenience of mental and physical properties often comes with token-identity of mental and physical particulars [Rowlands] |
6168 | The content of a thought is just the meaning of a sentence [Rowlands] |
6167 | Action is bodily movement caused by intentional states [Rowlands] |
6177 | Moral intuition seems unevenly distributed between people [Rowlands] |
6156 | The 17th century reintroduced atoms as mathematical modes of Euclidean space [Rowlands] |
6170 | Natural kinds are defined by their real essence, as in gold having atomic number 79 [Rowlands] |
6178 | It is common to see the value of nature in one feature, such as life, diversity, or integrity [Rowlands] |