14 ideas
| 10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
| 10882 | Predicative definitions only refer to entities outside the defined collection [Horsten] |
| 12766 | Logical space is abstracted from the actual world [Stalnaker] |
| 10884 | A theory is 'categorical' if it has just one model up to isomorphism [Horsten] |
| 10885 | Computer proofs don't provide explanations [Horsten] |
| 10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
| 10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
| 10881 | The concept of 'ordinal number' is set-theoretic, not arithmetical [Horsten] |
| 12764 | For the bare particular view, properties must be features, not just groups of objects [Stalnaker] |
| 12761 | An essential property is one had in all the possible worlds where a thing exists [Stalnaker] |
| 12763 | Necessarily self-identical, or being what it is, or its world-indexed properties, aren't essential [Stalnaker] |
| 12762 | Bare particular anti-essentialism makes no sense within modal logic semantics [Stalnaker] |
| 12765 | Why imagine that Babe Ruth might be a billiard ball; nothing useful could be said about the ball [Stalnaker] |
| 10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |