12 ideas
10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
15941 | For intuitionists excluded middle is an outdated historical convention [Brouwer] |
18247 | Brouwer saw reals as potential, not actual, and produced by a rule, or a choice [Brouwer, by Shapiro] |
10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
4483 | If abstract terms are sets of tropes, 'being a unicorn' and 'being a griffin' turn out identical [Loux] |
4481 | Austere nominalists insist that the realist's universals lack the requisite independent identifiability [Loux] |
4477 | Universals come in hierarchies of generality [Loux] |
4482 | Austere nominalism has to take a host of things (like being red, or human) as primitive [Loux] |
4478 | Nominalism needs to account for abstract singular terms like 'circularity'. [Loux] |
4480 | Times and places are identified by objects, so cannot be used in a theory of object-identity [Loux] |
10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |