17 ideas
10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
19528 | Knowledge is prior to believing, just as doing is prior to trying to do [Williamson] |
19527 | We don't acquire evidence and then derive some knowledge, because evidence IS knowledge [Williamson] |
19529 | Belief explains justification, and knowledge explains belief, so knowledge explains justification [Williamson] |
19536 | Knowledge-first says your total evidence IS your knowledge [Williamson] |
19530 | A neutral state of experience, between error and knowledge, is not basic; the successful state is basic [Williamson] |
19531 | Internalism about mind is an obsolete view, and knowledge-first epistemology develops externalism [Williamson] |
19526 | Surely I am acquainted with physical objects, not with appearances? [Williamson] |
7082 | Nature requires causal explanations, but society requires clarification by reasons and motives [Weber, by Critchley] |
10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |
19534 | How does inferentialism distinguish the patterns of inference that are essential to meaning? [Williamson] |
19535 | Internalist inferentialism has trouble explaining how meaning and reference relate [Williamson] |
19533 | Inferentialist semantics relies on internal inference relations, not on external references [Williamson] |
19532 | Truth-conditional referential semantics is externalist, referring to worldly items [Williamson] |
22155 | We are disenchanted because we rely on science, which ignores values [Weber, by Boulter] |