12 ideas
10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
15375 | If terms change their designations in different states, they are functions from states to objects [Fitting] |
15376 | Intensional logic adds a second type of quantification, over intensional objects, or individual concepts [Fitting] |
15378 | Awareness logic adds the restriction of an awareness function to epistemic logic [Fitting] |
15379 | Justication logics make explicit the reasons for mathematical truth in proofs [Fitting] |
11026 | Classical logic is deliberately extensional, in order to model mathematics [Fitting] |
11028 | λ-abstraction disambiguates the scope of modal operators [Fitting] |
10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
7803 | Modal logic began with translation difficulties for 'If...then' [Lewis,CI, by Girle] |
15377 | Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds [Fitting] |
10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |