Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction'', 'Truth' and 'Action, Reasons and Causes'

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18 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
10838 To explain a concept, we need its purpose, not just its rules of usage [Dummett]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
10528 Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
10837 It is part of the concept of truth that we aim at making true statements [Dummett]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
10840 We must be able to specify truths in a precise language, like winning moves in a game [Dummett]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
19171 Tarski's truth is like rules for winning games, without saying what 'winning' means [Dummett, by Davidson]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / d. Hume's Principle
10529 If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K]
10530 Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
7949 Varied descriptions of an event will explain varied behaviour relating to it [Davidson, by Macdonald,C]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
10839 You can't infer a dog's abstract concepts from its behaviour [Dummett]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
10527 An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 2. Duration of an Action
20020 If one action leads directly to another, they are all one action [Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
20072 We explain an intention by giving an account of acting with an intention [Davidson, by Stout,R]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / a. Acting on beliefs
20045 Acting for a reason is a combination of a pro attitude, and a belief that the action is appropriate [Davidson]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
23734 The best explanation of reasons as purposes for actions is that they are causal [Davidson, by Smith,M]
23737 Reasons can give purposes to actions, without actually causing them [Smith,M on Davidson]
20075 Early Davidson says intentional action is caused by reasons [Davidson, by Stout,R]
6664 Reasons must be causes when agents act 'for' reasons [Davidson, by Lowe]
3395 Davidson claims that what causes an action is the reason for doing it [Davidson, by Kim]