8 ideas
10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
21628 | To say reality itself is vague is not properly intelligible [Dummett] |
19727 | Reliabilist knowledge is evidence based belief, with high conditional probability [Comesaņa] |
19725 | In a sceptical scenario belief formation is unreliable, so no beliefs at all are justified? [Comesaņa] |
19726 | How do we decide which exact process is the one that needs to be reliable? [Comesaņa] |
10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |