13 ideas
| 10838 | To explain a concept, we need its purpose, not just its rules of usage [Dummett] |
| 10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
| 10837 | It is part of the concept of truth that we aim at making true statements [Dummett] |
| 10840 | We must be able to specify truths in a precise language, like winning moves in a game [Dummett] |
| 19171 | Tarski's truth is like rules for winning games, without saying what 'winning' means [Dummett, by Davidson] |
| 10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
| 10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
| 5504 | Maybe we should see persons in four dimensions, with stages or time-slices at an instant [Martin/Barresi] |
| 5503 | Maybe personal identity is not vital in survival, and other continuations would suffice [Martin/Barresi] |
| 5502 | Locke's intrinsic view of personal identity has been replaced by an externalist view [Martin/Barresi] |
| 10839 | You can't infer a dog's abstract concepts from its behaviour [Dummett] |
| 10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |
| 5505 | For Aristotle the psyche perishes with the body (except possibly 'nous') [Martin/Barresi] |