Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Question of Realism', 'Explanation: the state of play' and 'Ordinatio'

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28 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
If metaphysics can't be settled, it hardly matters whether it makes sense [Fine,K]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
'Quietist' says abandon metaphysics because answers are unattainable (as in Kant's noumenon) [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
If you make 'grounding' fundamental, you have to mention some non-fundamental notions [Sider on Fine,K]
Something is grounded when it holds, and is explained, and necessitated by something else [Fine,K, by Sider]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
Grounding relations are best expressed as relations between sentences [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Reduction might be producing a sentence which gets closer to the logical form [Fine,K]
Reduction might be semantic, where a reduced sentence is understood through its reduction [Fine,K]
Reduction is modal, if the reductions necessarily entail the truth of the target sentence [Fine,K]
The notion of reduction (unlike that of 'ground') implies the unreality of what is reduced [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Why should what is explanatorily basic be therefore more real? [Fine,K]
Reality is a primitive metaphysical concept, which cannot be understood in other terms [Fine,K]
What is real can only be settled in terms of 'ground' [Fine,K]
In metaphysics, reality is regarded as either 'factual', or as 'fundamental' [Fine,K]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Accidents must have formal being, if they are principles of real action, and of mental action and thought [Duns Scotus]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
If only the singular exists, science is impossible, as that relies on true generalities [Duns Scotus, by Panaccio]
If things were singular they would only differ numerically, but horse and tulip differ more than that [Duns Scotus, by Panaccio]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
We distinguish one thing from another by contradiction, because this is, and that is not [Duns Scotus]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
The haecceity is the featureless thing which gives ultimate individuality to a substance [Duns Scotus, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
It is absurd that there is no difference between a genuinely unified thing, and a mere aggregate [Duns Scotus]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
What prevents a stone from being divided into parts which are still the stone? [Duns Scotus]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
Two things are different if something is true of one and not of the other [Duns Scotus]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
Although colour depends on us, we can describe the world that way if it picks out fundamentals [Fine,K]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
Explanation is for curiosity, control, understanding, to make meaningful, or to give authority [Stanford]
Audience-relative explanation, or metaphysical explanation based on information? [Stanford]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
We can explain by showing constitution, as well as showing causes [Stanford]
Grounding is an explanation of truth, and needs all the virtues of good explanations [Fine,K]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
Ultimate explanations are in 'grounds', which account for other truths, which hold in virtue of the grounding [Fine,K]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 5. Unity of Propositions
A proposition ingredient is 'essential' if changing it would change the truth-value [Fine,K]