43 ideas
15053 | If metaphysics can't be settled, it hardly matters whether it makes sense [Fine,K] |
15054 | 'Quietist' says abandon metaphysics because answers are unattainable (as in Kant's noumenon) [Fine,K] |
7807 | The laws of thought are true, but they are not the axioms of logic [Bolzano, by George/Van Evra] |
9618 | Bolzano wanted to reduce all of geometry to arithmetic [Bolzano, by Brown,JR] |
9830 | Bolzano began the elimination of intuition, by proving something which seemed obvious [Bolzano, by Dummett] |
15007 | If you make 'grounding' fundamental, you have to mention some non-fundamental notions [Sider on Fine,K] |
15006 | Something is grounded when it holds, and is explained, and necessitated by something else [Fine,K, by Sider] |
15055 | Grounding relations are best expressed as relations between sentences [Fine,K] |
17265 | Philosophical proofs in mathematics establish truths, and also show their grounds [Bolzano, by Correia/Schnieder] |
15050 | Reduction might be producing a sentence which gets closer to the logical form [Fine,K] |
15051 | Reduction might be semantic, where a reduced sentence is understood through its reduction [Fine,K] |
15052 | Reduction is modal, if the reductions necessarily entail the truth of the target sentence [Fine,K] |
15056 | The notion of reduction (unlike that of 'ground') implies the unreality of what is reduced [Fine,K] |
15060 | Why should what is explanatorily basic be therefore more real? [Fine,K] |
15046 | Reality is a primitive metaphysical concept, which cannot be understood in other terms [Fine,K] |
15047 | What is real can only be settled in terms of 'ground' [Fine,K] |
15048 | In metaphysics, reality is regarded as either 'factual', or as 'fundamental' [Fine,K] |
16185 | Causality indicates which properties are real [Cartwright,N] |
15061 | Although colour depends on us, we can describe the world that way if it picks out fundamentals [Fine,K] |
9185 | Bolzano wanted to avoid Kantian intuitions, and prove everything that could be proved [Bolzano, by Dummett] |
16182 | Two main types of explanation are by causes, or by citing a theoretical framework [Cartwright,N] |
16184 | An explanation is a model that fits a theory and predicts the phenomenological laws [Cartwright,N] |
16167 | Laws get the facts wrong, and explanation rests on improvements and qualifications of laws [Cartwright,N] |
16169 | Laws apply to separate domains, but real explanations apply to intersecting domains [Cartwright,N] |
16171 | The covering law view assumes that each phenomenon has a 'right' explanation [Cartwright,N] |
16176 | Covering-law explanation lets us explain storms by falling barometers [Cartwright,N] |
16177 | I disagree with the covering-law view that there is a law to cover every single case [Cartwright,N] |
16180 | You can't explain one quail's behaviour by just saying that all quails do it [Cartwright,N] |
15059 | Grounding is an explanation of truth, and needs all the virtues of good explanations [Fine,K] |
15057 | Ultimate explanations are in 'grounds', which account for other truths, which hold in virtue of the grounding [Fine,K] |
16183 | In science, best explanations have regularly turned out to be false [Cartwright,N] |
22276 | Bolzano saw propositions as objective entities, existing independently of us [Bolzano, by Potter] |
17264 | Propositions are abstract structures of concepts, ready for judgement or assertion [Bolzano, by Correia/Schnieder] |
12232 | A 'proposition' is the sense of a linguistic expression, and can be true or false [Bolzano] |
15058 | A proposition ingredient is 'essential' if changing it would change the truth-value [Fine,K] |
12233 | The ground of a pure conceptual truth is only in other conceptual truths [Bolzano] |
16175 | A cause won't increase the effect frequency if other causes keep interfering [Cartwright,N] |
6781 | There are fundamental explanatory laws (false!), and phenomenological laws (regularities) [Cartwright,N, by Bird] |
16166 | Laws of appearances are 'phenomenological'; laws of reality are 'theoretical' [Cartwright,N] |
16179 | Good organisation may not be true, and the truth may not organise very much [Cartwright,N] |
16178 | There are few laws for when one theory meets another [Cartwright,N] |
16170 | To get from facts to equations, we need a prepared descriptions suited to mathematics [Cartwright,N] |
16181 | Simple laws have quite different outcomes when they act in combinations [Cartwright,N] |