13 ideas
| 10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
| 17813 | Löwenheim-Skolem says any theory with a true interpretation has a model in the natural numbers [White,NP] |
| 17812 | Finite cardinalities don't need numbers as objects; numerical quantifiers will do [White,NP] |
| 10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
| 10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
| 5163 | Basic propositions refer to a single experience, are incorrigible, and conclusively verifiable [Ayer] |
| 5167 | The argument from analogy fails, so the best account of other minds is behaviouristic [Ayer] |
| 10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |
| 5164 | A statement is meaningful if observation statements can be deduced from it [Ayer] |
| 5165 | Directly verifiable statements must entail at least one new observation statement [Ayer] |
| 5166 | The principle of verification is not an empirical hypothesis, but a definition [Ayer] |
| 5162 | Sentences only express propositions if they are meaningful; otherwise they are 'statements' [Ayer] |
| 5168 | Moral approval and disapproval concerns classes of actions, rather than particular actions [Ayer] |