Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism', 'Sets, Aggregates and Numbers' and 'Naming and Necessity preface'

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18 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
Possible worlds allowed the application of set-theoretic models to modal logic [Kripke]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
A man has two names if the historical chains are different - even if they are the same! [Kripke]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
How many? must first partition an aggregate into sets, and then logic fixes its number [Yourgrau]
Nothing is 'intrinsically' numbered [Yourgrau]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
Defining 'three' as the principle of collection or property of threes explains set theory definitions [Yourgrau]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / b. Mathematics is not set theory
We can't use sets as foundations for mathematics if we must await results from the upper reaches [Yourgrau]
You can ask all sorts of numerical questions about any one given set [Yourgrau]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 3. Three-Dimensionalism
3-D says things are stretched in space but not in time, and entire at a time but not at a location [Fine,K]
Genuine motion, rather than variation of position, requires the 'entire presence' of the object [Fine,K]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
4-D says things are stretched in space and in time, and not entire at a time or at a location [Fine,K]
You can ask when the wedding was, but not (usually) when the bride was [Fine,K, by Simons]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
Three-dimensionalist can accept temporal parts, as things enduring only for an instant [Fine,K]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
With the necessity of self-identity plus Leibniz's Law, identity has to be an 'internal' relation [Kripke]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
The indiscernibility of identicals is as self-evident as the law of contradiction [Kripke]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
I don't think possible worlds reductively reveal the natures of modal operators etc. [Kripke]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 2. A Priori Contingent
The very act of designating of an object with properties gives knowledge of a contingent truth [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
Instead of talking about possible worlds, we can always say "It is possible that.." [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Probability with dice uses possible worlds, abstractions which fictionally simplify things [Kripke]