88 ideas
17275 | Realist metaphysics concerns what is real; naive metaphysics concerns natures of things [Fine,K] |
10237 | Coherence is a primitive, intuitive notion, not reduced to something formal [Shapiro] |
10204 | An 'implicit definition' gives a direct description of the relations of an entity [Shapiro] |
17282 | Truths need not always have their source in what exists [Fine,K] |
17283 | If the truth-making relation is modal, then modal truths will be grounded in anything [Fine,K] |
10206 | Modal operators are usually treated as quantifiers [Shapiro] |
10252 | The Axiom of Choice seems to license an infinite amount of choosing [Shapiro] |
10208 | Axiom of Choice: some function has a value for every set in a given set [Shapiro] |
10304 | Very few things in set theory remain valid in intuitionist mathematics [Bernays] |
10207 | Anti-realists reject set theory [Shapiro] |
17286 | Logical consequence is verification by a possible world within a truth-set [Fine,K] |
10259 | The two standard explanations of consequence are semantic (in models) and deductive [Shapiro] |
10257 | Intuitionism only sanctions modus ponens if all three components are proved [Shapiro] |
10253 | Either logic determines objects, or objects determine logic, or they are separate [Shapiro] |
10251 | The law of excluded middle might be seen as a principle of omniscience [Shapiro] |
10212 | Classical connectives differ from their ordinary language counterparts; '∧' is timeless, unlike 'and' [Shapiro] |
10209 | A function is just an arbitrary correspondence between collections [Shapiro] |
10268 | Maybe plural quantifiers should be understood in terms of classes or sets [Shapiro] |
10235 | A sentence is 'satisfiable' if it has a model [Shapiro] |
10239 | The central notion of model theory is the relation of 'satisfaction' [Shapiro] |
10240 | Model theory deals with relations, reference and extensions [Shapiro] |
10238 | The set-theoretical hierarchy contains as many isomorphism types as possible [Shapiro] |
10214 | Theory ontology is never complete, but is only determined 'up to isomorphism' [Shapiro] |
10234 | Any theory with an infinite model has a model of every infinite cardinality [Shapiro] |
10201 | Virtually all of mathematics can be modeled in set theory [Shapiro] |
10213 | Real numbers are thought of as either Cauchy sequences or Dedekind cuts [Shapiro] |
18243 | Understanding the real-number structure is knowing usage of the axiomatic language of analysis [Shapiro] |
18245 | Cuts are made by the smallest upper or largest lower number, some of them not rational [Shapiro] |
10236 | There is no grounding for mathematics that is more secure than mathematics [Shapiro] |
10256 | For intuitionists, proof is inherently informal [Shapiro] |
10202 | Natural numbers just need an initial object, successors, and an induction principle [Shapiro] |
10205 | Mathematics originally concerned the continuous (geometry) and the discrete (arithmetic) [Shapiro] |
10222 | Mathematical foundations may not be sets; categories are a popular rival [Shapiro] |
10218 | Baseball positions and chess pieces depend entirely on context [Shapiro] |
10224 | The even numbers have the natural-number structure, with 6 playing the role of 3 [Shapiro] |
10228 | Could infinite structures be apprehended by pattern recognition? [Shapiro] |
10230 | The 4-pattern is the structure common to all collections of four objects [Shapiro] |
10249 | The main mathematical structures are algebraic, ordered, and topological [Shapiro] |
10273 | Some structures are exemplified by both abstract and concrete [Shapiro] |
10276 | Mathematical structures are defined by axioms, or in set theory [Shapiro] |
10270 | The main versions of structuralism are all definitionally equivalent [Shapiro] |
10221 | Is there is no more to structures than the systems that exemplify them? [Shapiro] |
10248 | Number statements are generalizations about number sequences, and are bound variables [Shapiro] |
10220 | Because one structure exemplifies several systems, a structure is a one-over-many [Shapiro] |
10223 | There is no 'structure of all structures', just as there is no set of all sets [Shapiro] |
8703 | Shapiro's structuralism says model theory (comparing structures) is the essence of mathematics [Shapiro, by Friend] |
10274 | Does someone using small numbers really need to know the infinite structure of arithmetic? [Shapiro] |
10303 | Restricted Platonism is just an ideal projection of a domain of thought [Bernays] |
10200 | We distinguish realism 'in ontology' (for objects), and 'in truth-value' (for being either true or false) [Shapiro] |
10210 | If mathematical objects are accepted, then a number of standard principles will follow [Shapiro] |
10215 | Platonists claim we can state the essence of a number without reference to the others [Shapiro] |
10233 | Platonism must accept that the Peano Axioms could all be false [Shapiro] |
10244 | Intuition is an outright hindrance to five-dimensional geometry [Shapiro] |
10280 | A stone is a position in some pattern, and can be viewed as an object, or as a location [Shapiro] |
10306 | Mathematical abstraction just goes in a different direction from logic [Bernays] |
10254 | Can the ideal constructor also destroy objects? [Shapiro] |
10255 | Presumably nothing can block a possible dynamic operation? [Shapiro] |
10279 | Can we discover whether a deck is fifty-two cards, or a person is time-slices or molecules? [Shapiro] |
17272 | 2+2=4 is necessary if it is snowing, but not true in virtue of the fact that it is snowing [Fine,K] |
17276 | If you say one thing causes another, that leaves open that the 'other' has its own distinct reality [Fine,K] |
17284 | An immediate ground is the next lower level, which gives the concept of a hierarchy [Fine,K] |
17285 | 'Strict' ground moves down the explanations, but 'weak' ground can move sideways [Fine,K] |
17288 | We learn grounding from what is grounded, not what does the grounding [Fine,K] |
17281 | If grounding is a relation it must be between entities of the same type, preferably between facts [Fine,K] |
17280 | Ground is best understood as a sentence operator, rather than a relation between predicates [Fine,K] |
17290 | Only metaphysical grounding must be explained by essence [Fine,K] |
17274 | Philosophical explanation is largely by ground (just as cause is used in science) [Fine,K] |
17278 | We can only explain how a reduction is possible if we accept the concept of ground [Fine,K] |
10227 | The abstract/concrete boundary now seems blurred, and would need a defence [Shapiro] |
10226 | Mathematicians regard arithmetic as concrete, and group theory as abstract [Shapiro] |
10262 | Fictionalism eschews the abstract, but it still needs the possible (without model theory) [Shapiro] |
10277 | Structuralism blurs the distinction between mathematical and ordinary objects [Shapiro] |
17287 | Facts, such as redness and roundness of a ball, can be 'fused' into one fact [Fine,K] |
10272 | The notion of 'object' is at least partially structural and mathematical [Shapiro] |
10275 | A blurry border is still a border [Shapiro] |
17279 | Even a three-dimensionalist might identify temporal parts, in their thinking [Fine,K] |
10258 | Logical modalities may be acceptable, because they are reducible to satisfaction in models [Shapiro] |
17289 | Every necessary truth is grounded in the nature of something [Fine,K] |
17273 | Each basic modality has its 'own' explanatory relation [Fine,K] |
10266 | Why does the 'myth' of possible worlds produce correct modal logic? [Shapiro] |
17291 | We explain by identity (what it is), or by truth (how things are) [Fine,K] |
17271 | Is there metaphysical explanation (as well as causal), involving a constitutive form of determination? [Fine,K] |
10203 | We apprehend small, finite mathematical structures by abstraction from patterns [Shapiro] |
17277 | If mind supervenes on the physical, it may also explain the physical (and not vice versa) [Fine,K] |
10229 | Simple types can be apprehended through their tokens, via abstraction [Shapiro] |
10217 | We can apprehend structures by focusing on or ignoring features of patterns [Shapiro] |
9554 | We can focus on relations between objects (like baseballers), ignoring their other features [Shapiro] |
10231 | Abstract objects might come by abstraction over an equivalence class of base entities [Shapiro] |