Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Some Puzzles of Ground', 'works' and 'Apriority as an Evaluative Notion'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

10 ideas

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 3. Hermeneutics
5438 Hermeneutics of tradition is sympathetic, hermeneutics of suspicion is hostile [Ricoeur, by Mautner]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 4. Circularity
9161 Maybe reasonableness requires circular justifications - that is one coherentist view [Field,H]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 3. Many-Valued Logic
14263 Strong Kleene disjunction just needs one true disjunct; Weak needs the other to have some value [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
14262 Formal grounding needs transitivity of grounding, no self-grounding, and the existence of both parties [Fine,K]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
9160 Lots of propositions are default reasonable, but the a priori ones are empirically indefeasible [Field,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 7. A Priori from Convention
9164 We treat basic rules as if they were indefeasible and a priori, with no interest in counter-evidence [Field,H]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
9165 Reliability only makes a rule reasonable if we place a value on the truth produced by reliable processes [Field,H]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
9162 Believing nothing, or only logical truths, is very reliable, but we want a lot more than that [Field,H]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
9166 People vary in their epistemological standards, and none of them is 'correct' [Field,H]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
9163 If we only use induction to assess induction, it is empirically indefeasible, and hence a priori [Field,H]