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All the ideas for 'Guide to Ground', 'Truth' and 'Db (ideas)'

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41 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
17275 Realist metaphysics concerns what is real; naive metaphysics concerns natures of things [Fine,K]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
4465 Note that "is" can assert existence, or predication, or identity, or classification [PG]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 1. Fallacy
4686 Fallacies are errors in reasoning, 'formal' if a clear rule is breached, and 'informal' if more general [PG]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 3. Question Begging
7415 Question-begging assumes the proposition which is being challenged [PG]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 6. Fallacy of Division
7414 What is true of a set is also true of its members [PG]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 7. Ad Hominem
6696 The Ad Hominem Fallacy criticises the speaker rather than the argument [PG]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
17282 Truths need not always have their source in what exists [Fine,K]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 7. Making Modal Truths
17283 If the truth-making relation is modal, then modal truths will be grounded in anything [Fine,K]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
10842 The fact which is stated by a true sentence is not something in the world [Strawson,P]
10843 Facts aren't exactly true statements, but they are what those statements say [Strawson,P]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
10844 The statement that it is raining perfectly fits the fact that it is raining [Strawson,P]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
10841 The word 'true' always refers to a possible statement [Strawson,P]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 3. Minimalist Truth
4687 Minimal theories of truth avoid ontological commitment to such things as 'facts' or 'reality' [PG]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
17286 Logical consequence is verification by a possible world within a truth-set [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox
6516 Monty Hall Dilemma: do you abandon your preference after Monty eliminates one of the rivals? [PG]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
17272 2+2=4 is necessary if it is snowing, but not true in virtue of the fact that it is snowing [Fine,K]
17276 If you say one thing causes another, that leaves open that the 'other' has its own distinct reality [Fine,K]
17284 An immediate ground is the next lower level, which gives the concept of a hierarchy [Fine,K]
17285 'Strict' ground moves down the explanations, but 'weak' ground can move sideways [Fine,K]
17288 We learn grounding from what is grounded, not what does the grounding [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
17281 If grounding is a relation it must be between entities of the same type, preferably between facts [Fine,K]
17280 Ground is best understood as a sentence operator, rather than a relation between predicates [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation
17290 Only metaphysical grounding must be explained by essence [Fine,K]
17274 Philosophical explanation is largely by ground (just as cause is used in science) [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / d. Grounding and reduction
17278 We can only explain how a reduction is possible if we accept the concept of ground [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
17287 Facts, such as redness and roundness of a ball, can be 'fused' into one fact [Fine,K]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
17279 Even a three-dimensionalist might identify temporal parts, in their thinking [Fine,K]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
24054 Everything has a probability, something will happen, and probabilities add up [PG]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
17273 Each basic modality has its 'own' explanatory relation [Fine,K]
17289 Every necessary truth is grounded in the nature of something [Fine,K]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / a. Naïve realism
3875 If reality is just what we perceive, we would have no need for a sixth sense [PG]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
3876 If my team is losing 3-1, I have synthetic a priori knowledge that they need two goals for a draw [PG]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
17291 We explain by identity (what it is), or by truth (how things are) [Fine,K]
17271 Is there metaphysical explanation (as well as causal), involving a constitutive form of determination? [Fine,K]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
17277 If mind supervenes on the physical, it may also explain the physical (and not vice versa) [Fine,K]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
7734 Maybe a mollusc's brain events for pain ARE of the same type (broadly) as a human's [PG]
7735 Maybe a frog's brain events for fear are functionally like ours, but not phenomenally [PG]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 4. Unfairness
3877 Utilitarianism seems to justify the discreet murder of unhappy people [PG]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
6126 Life is Movement, Respiration, Sensation, Nutrition, Excretion, Reproduction, Growth (MRS NERG) [PG]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
3873 An omniscient being couldn't know it was omniscient, as that requires information from beyond its scope of knowledge [PG]
3874 How could God know there wasn't an unknown force controlling his 'free' will? [PG]