14 ideas
| 10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
| 10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
| 10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
| 16659 | Relations do not add anything to reality, though they are real aspects of the world [Olivi] |
| 21339 | We want the ontology of relations, not just a formal way of specifying them [Heil] |
| 21349 | Two people are indirectly related by height; the direct relation is internal, between properties [Heil] |
| 21340 | Maybe all the other features of the world can be reduced to relations [Heil] |
| 21348 | In the case of 5 and 6, their relational truthmaker is just the numbers [Heil] |
| 21351 | Truthmaking is a clear example of an internal relation [Heil] |
| 21344 | If R internally relates a and b, and you have a and b, you thereby have R [Heil] |
| 21350 | If properties are powers, then causal relations are internal relations [Heil] |
| 16673 | Quantity just adds union and location to the extension of parts [Olivi] |
| 10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |
| 16663 | Things are limited by the species to certain modes of being [Olivi] |