10 ideas
10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
21597 | Logical connectives have the highest precision, yet are infected by the vagueness of true and false [Russell, by Williamson] |
10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
9051 | Since natural language is not precise it cannot be in the province of logic [Russell, by Keefe/Smith] |
9054 | Vagueness is only a characteristic of representations, such as language [Russell] |
10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |
22485 | Non-cognitivists give the conditions of use of moral sentences as facts about the speaker [Foot] |
22486 | The mistake is to think good grounds aren't enough for moral judgement, which also needs feelings [Foot] |
22487 | Moral arguments are grounded in human facts [Foot] |