21 ideas
16477 | Asserting not-p is saying p is false [Russell] |
16484 | There are four experiences that lead us to talk of 'some' things [Russell] |
16486 | The physical world doesn't need logic, but the mental world does [Russell] |
2947 | Questions wouldn't lead anywhere without the law of excluded middle [Russell] |
16480 | A disjunction expresses indecision [Russell] |
16479 | 'Or' expresses hesitation, in a dog at a crossroads, or birds risking grabbing crumbs [Russell] |
16481 | 'Or' expresses a mental state, not something about the world [Russell] |
16487 | Maybe the 'or' used to describe mental states is not the 'or' of logic [Russell] |
16483 | Disjunction may also arise in practice if there is imperfect memory. [Russell] |
16475 | A 'heterological' predicate can't be predicated of itself; so is 'heterological' heterological? Yes=no! [Russell] |
12295 | 3-D says things are stretched in space but not in time, and entire at a time but not at a location [Fine,K] |
12298 | Genuine motion, rather than variation of position, requires the 'entire presence' of the object [Fine,K] |
12296 | 4-D says things are stretched in space and in time, and not entire at a time or at a location [Fine,K] |
18882 | You can ask when the wedding was, but not (usually) when the bride was [Fine,K, by Simons] |
12297 | Three-dimensionalist can accept temporal parts, as things enduring only for an instant [Fine,K] |
16482 | All our knowledge (if verbal) is general, because all sentences contain general words [Russell] |
4758 | Naïve realism leads to physics, but physics then shows that naïve realism is false [Russell] |
16476 | For simple words, a single experience can show that they are true [Russell] |
16485 | Perception can't prove universal generalisations, so abandon them, or abandon empiricism? [Russell] |
6027 | From the fact that some men die, we cannot infer that they all do [Philodemus] |
16478 | A mother cat is paralysed if equidistant between two needy kittens [Russell] |