12 ideas
| 10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
| 10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
| 10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
| 16657 | Substance, Quantity and Quality are real; other categories depend on those three [Henry of Ghent] |
| 16658 | The only reality in the category of Relation is things from another category [Henry of Ghent] |
| 16645 | Accidents are diminished beings, because they are dispositions of substance (unqualified being) [Henry of Ghent] |
| 16730 | If matter is entirely atoms, anything else we notice in it can only be modes [Gassendi] |
| 22012 | Kant says things-in-themselves cause sensations, but then makes causation transcendental! [Henry of Ghent, by Pinkard] |
| 16619 | We observe qualities, and use 'induction' to refer to the substances lying under them [Gassendi] |
| 10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |
| 16593 | Atoms are not points, but hard indivisible things, which no force in nature can divide [Gassendi] |
| 16729 | How do mere atoms produce qualities like colour, flavour and odour? [Gassendi] |