12 ideas
10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
16730 | If matter is entirely atoms, anything else we notice in it can only be modes [Gassendi] |
16619 | We observe qualities, and use 'induction' to refer to the substances lying under them [Gassendi] |
5504 | Maybe we should see persons in four dimensions, with stages or time-slices at an instant [Martin/Barresi] |
5503 | Maybe personal identity is not vital in survival, and other continuations would suffice [Martin/Barresi] |
5502 | Locke's intrinsic view of personal identity has been replaced by an externalist view [Martin/Barresi] |
10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |
16593 | Atoms are not points, but hard indivisible things, which no force in nature can divide [Gassendi] |
16729 | How do mere atoms produce qualities like colour, flavour and odour? [Gassendi] |
5505 | For Aristotle the psyche perishes with the body (except possibly 'nous') [Martin/Barresi] |