34 ideas
19275 | You cannot understand what exists without understanding possibility and necessity [Hale] |
19291 | A canonical defintion specifies the type of thing, and what distinguish this specimen [Hale] |
19297 | The two Barcan principles are easily proved in fairly basic modal logic [Hale] |
19301 | With a negative free logic, we can dispense with the Barcan formulae [Hale] |
19296 | If second-order variables range over sets, those are just objects; properties and relations aren't sets [Hale] |
19289 | Maybe conventionalism applies to meaning, but not to the truth of propositions expressed [Hale] |
19298 | Unlike axiom proofs, natural deduction proofs needn't focus on logical truths and theorems [Hale] |
19295 | Add Hume's principle to logic, to get numbers; arithmetic truths rest on the nature of the numbers [Hale] |
19281 | Interesting supervenience must characterise the base quite differently from what supervenes on it [Hale] |
19278 | There is no gap between a fact that p, and it is true that p; so we only have the truth-condtions for p [Hale] |
19302 | If a chair could be made of slightly different material, that could lead to big changes [Hale] |
19290 | Absolute necessities are necessarily necessary [Hale] |
19286 | 'Absolute necessity' is when there is no restriction on the things which necessitate p [Hale] |
19288 | Logical and metaphysical necessities differ in their vocabulary, and their underlying entities [Hale] |
19285 | Logical necessity is something which is true, no matter what else is the case [Hale] |
19287 | Maybe each type of logic has its own necessity, gradually becoming broader [Hale] |
9216 | Each area of enquiry, and its source, has its own distinctive type of necessity [Fine,K] |
19282 | It seems that we cannot show that modal facts depend on non-modal facts [Hale] |
19276 | The big challenge for essentialist views of modality is things having necessary existence [Hale] |
19293 | Essentialism doesn't explain necessity reductively; it explains all necessities in terms of a few basic natures [Hale] |
19294 | If necessity derives from essences, how do we explain the necessary existence of essences? [Hale] |
19279 | What are these worlds, that being true in all of them makes something necessary? [Hale] |
19299 | Possible worlds make every proposition true or false, which endorses classical logic [Hale] |
6230 | If the soul were a tabula rasa, with no innate ideas, there could be no moral goodness or justice [Cudworth] |
6228 | Senses cannot judge one another, so what judges senses cannot be a sense, but must be superior [Cudworth] |
9214 | Unsupported testimony may still be believable [Fine,K] |
6229 | Sense is fixed in the material form, and so can't grasp abstract universals [Cudworth] |
19300 | The molecules may explain the water, but they are not what 'water' means [Hale] |
6227 | Keeping promises and contracts is an obligation of natural justice [Cudworth] |
6225 | Obligation to obey all positive laws is older than all laws [Cudworth] |
9215 | Causation is easier to disrupt than logic, so metaphysics is part of nature, not vice versa [Fine,K] |
6224 | An omnipotent will cannot make two things equal or alike if they aren't [Cudworth] |
6223 | If the will and pleasure of God controls justice, then anything wicked or unjust would become good if God commanded it [Cudworth] |
6226 | The requirement that God must be obeyed must precede any authority of God's commands [Cudworth] |