Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Intro to 'Modality and Tense'', 'Two letters on mind' and 'Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature?'

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22 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
9208 Philosophers with a new concept are like children with a new toy [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
9210 Possible objects are abstract; actual concrete objects are possible; so abstract/concrete are compatible [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
9211 A non-standard realism, with no privileged standpoint, might challenge its absoluteness or coherence [Fine,K]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
16635 Incorporeal substances are powers or forces [Descartes, by Pasnau]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
9202 Objects, as well as sentences, can have logical form [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
9206 We must distinguish between the identity or essence of an object, and its necessary features [Fine,K]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
9205 The three basic types of necessity are metaphysical, natural and normative [Fine,K]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
9209 Metaphysical necessity may be 'whatever the circumstance', or 'regardless of circumstances' [Fine,K]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
9200 Empiricists suspect modal notions: either it happens or it doesn't; it is just regularities. [Fine,K]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
12790 Generalisations must be invariant to explain anything [Leuridan]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / h. Explanations by function
12789 Biological functions are explained by disposition, or by causal role [Leuridan]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
14388 Mechanisms must produce macro-level regularities, but that needs micro-level regularities [Leuridan]
14386 Mechanisms are ontologically dependent on regularities [Leuridan]
12787 Mechanisms can't explain on their own, as their models rest on pragmatic regularities [Leuridan]
14384 We can show that regularities and pragmatic laws are more basic than mechanisms [Leuridan]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
14389 There is nothing wrong with an infinite regress of mechanisms and regularities [Leuridan]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
9207 If sentence content is all worlds where it is true, all necessary truths have the same content! [Fine,K]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 3. Natural Function
14387 Rather than dispositions, functions may be the element that brought a thing into existence [Leuridan]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / c. Matter as extension
16684 Impenetrability only belongs to the essence of extension [Descartes]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities
14382 Pragmatic laws allow prediction and explanation, to the extent that reality is stable [Leuridan]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
14385 Strict regularities are rarely discovered in life sciences [Leuridan]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
14383 A 'law of nature' is just a regularity, not some entity that causes the regularity [Leuridan]