9 ideas
10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
23476 | Logical constants seem to be entities in propositions, but are actually pure form [Russell] |
23477 | We use logical notions, so they must be objects - but I don't know what they really are [Russell] |
18273 | Logical truths are known by their extreme generality [Russell] |
10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
22315 | There can't be a negative of a complex, which is negated by its non-existence [Potter on Russell] |
15793 | We can take 'ways things might have been' as irreducible elements in our ontology [Stalnaker, by Lycan] |
10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |