Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism', 'Reference and Necessity' and 'Semantic Necessity'

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22 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 8. Theories in Logic
14620 Theories in logic are sentences closed under consequence, but in truth discussions theories have axioms [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
16405 To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient? [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
16407 Possible worlds allow separating all the properties, without hitting a bare particular [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 3. Three-Dimensionalism
12295 3-D says things are stretched in space but not in time, and entire at a time but not at a location [Fine,K]
12298 Genuine motion, rather than variation of position, requires the 'entire presence' of the object [Fine,K]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
12296 4-D says things are stretched in space and in time, and not entire at a time or at a location [Fine,K]
18882 You can ask when the wedding was, but not (usually) when the bride was [Fine,K, by Simons]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
12297 Three-dimensionalist can accept temporal parts, as things enduring only for an instant [Fine,K]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
14530 The role of semantic necessity in semantics is like metaphysical necessity in metaphysics [Fine,K, by Hale/Hoffmann,A]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
16397 If it might be true, it might be true in particular ways, and possible worlds describe such ways [Stalnaker]
16399 Possible worlds are ontologically neutral, but a commitment to possibilities remains [Stalnaker]
16398 Possible worlds allow discussion of modality without controversial modal auxiliaries [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
16396 Kripke's possible worlds are methodological, not metaphysical [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
16408 Rigid designation seems to presuppose that differing worlds contain the same individuals [Stalnaker]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
16406 If you don't know what you say you can't mean it; what people say usually fits what they mean [Stalnaker]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
16404 In the use of a name, many individuals are causally involved, but they aren't all the referent [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
16403 'Descriptive' semantics gives a system for a language; 'foundational' semantics give underlying facts [Stalnaker]
14618 Semantics is either an assignment of semantic values, or a theory of truth [Fine,K]
14621 Semantics is a body of semantic requirements, not semantic truths or assigned values [Fine,K]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
16401 To understand an utterance, you must understand what the world would be like if it is true [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 7. Extensional Semantics
14622 Referential semantics (unlike Fregeanism) allows objects themselves in to semantic requirements [Fine,K]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique
14619 The Quinean doubt: are semantics and facts separate, and do analytic sentences have no factual part? [Fine,K]