10 ideas
10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
15395 | Give up objects necessitating truths, and say their natures cause the truths? [Cameron] |
15394 | Truthmaker requires a commitment to tropes or states of affairs, for contingent truths [Cameron] |
10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
15401 | Essentialists say intrinsic properties arise from what the thing is, irrespective of surroundings [Cameron] |
15393 | An object's intrinsic properties are had in virtue of how it is, independently [Cameron] |
15396 | Most criteria for identity over time seem to leave two later objects identical to the earlier one [Cameron] |
15793 | We can take 'ways things might have been' as irreducible elements in our ontology [Stalnaker, by Lycan] |
10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |