14 ideas
10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
6021 | It is only when we say a proposition that we speak truly or falsely [Sext.Empiricus] |
10779 | A comprehension axiom is 'predicative' if the formula has no bound second-order variables [Linnebo] |
10781 | A 'pure logic' must be ontologically innocent, universal, and without presuppositions [Linnebo] |
6020 | 'Man is a rational mortal animal' is equivalent to 'if something is a man, that thing is a rational mortal animal' [Sext.Empiricus] |
10778 | Can second-order logic be ontologically first-order, with all the benefits of second-order? [Linnebo] |
10783 | Plural quantification depends too heavily on combinatorial and set-theoretic considerations [Linnebo] |
10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
10782 | The modern concept of an object is rooted in quantificational logic [Linnebo] |
6026 | How can you investigate without some preconception of your object? [Sext.Empiricus] |
10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |
6032 | Right actions, once done, are those with a reasonable justification [Sext.Empiricus] |
1517 | The tektraktys (1+2+3+4=10) is the 'fount of ever-flowing nature' [Sext.Empiricus] |