15 ideas
| 10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
| 18901 | Truthmakers are facts 'of' a domain, not something 'in' the domain [Sommers] |
| 18904 | 'Predicable' terms come in charged pairs, with one the negation of the other [Sommers, by Engelbretsen] |
| 18895 | Logic which maps ordinary reasoning must be transparent, and free of variables [Sommers] |
| 18897 | Predicate logic has to spell out that its identity relation '=' is an equivalent relation [Sommers] |
| 18893 | Translating into quantificational idiom offers no clues as to how ordinary thinkers reason [Sommers] |
| 18903 | Sommers promotes the old idea that negation basically refers to terms [Sommers, by Engelbretsen] |
| 18894 | Predicates form a hierarchy, from the most general, down to names at the bottom [Sommers] |
| 10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
| 10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
| 18900 | Unfortunately for realists, modern logic cannot say that some fact exists [Sommers] |
| 10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |
| 18898 | In standard logic, names are the only way to refer [Sommers] |
| 23812 | Force is what turns man into a thing, and ultimately into a corpse [Weil] |
| 23813 | Only people who understand force, and don't respect it, are capable of justice [Weil] |