Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Semantic Relationism', 'Gravity and Grace (9 extracts)' and 'What Does It Take to Refer?'

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50 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
We seek truth only because it is good [Weil]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 6. Free Logic
Free logic at least allows empty names, but struggles to express non-existence [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
In first-order we can't just assert existence, and it is very hard to deny something's existence [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 3. Constants in Logic
In logic constants play the role of proper names [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
It seemed that Frege gave the syntax for variables, and Tarski the semantics, and that was that [Fine,K]
In separate expressions variables seem identical in role, but in the same expression they aren't [Fine,K]
The 'algebraic' account of variables reduces quantification to the algebra of its component parts [Fine,K]
'Instantial' accounts of variables say we grasp arbitrary instances from their use in quantification [Fine,K]
The usual Tarskian interpretation of variables is to specify their range of values [Fine,K]
Variables can be viewed as special terms - functions taking assignments into individuals [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Proper names can be non-referential - even predicate as well as attributive uses [Bach]
Cicero/Cicero and Cicero/Tully may differ in relationship, despite being semantically the same [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
Millian names struggle with existence, empty names, identities and attitude ascription [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / a. Descriptions
An object can be described without being referred to [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
Definite descriptions can be used to refer, but are not semantically referential [Bach]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
I can only represent individuals as the same if I do not already represent them as the same [Fine,K]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
If Cicero=Tully refers to the man twice, then surely Cicero=Cicero does as well? [Fine,K]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
Mental files are devices for keeping track of basic coordination of objects [Fine,K]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
You cannot determine the full content from a thought's intrinsic character, as relations are involved [Fine,K]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
Fictional reference is different inside and outside the fiction [Bach]
We can refer to fictional entities if they are abstract objects [Bach]
You 'allude to', not 'refer to', an individual if you keep their identity vague [Bach]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
What refers: indefinite or definite or demonstrative descriptions, names, indexicals, demonstratives? [Bach]
If we can refer to things which change, we can't be obliged to single out their properties [Bach]
We can think of an individual without have a uniquely characterizing description [Bach]
It can't be real reference if it could refer to some other thing that satisfies the description [Bach]
Since most expressions can be used non-referentially, none of them are inherently referential [Bach]
Just alluding to or describing an object is not the same as referring to it [Bach]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
Context does not create reference; it is just something speakers can exploit [Bach]
'That duck' may not refer to the most obvious one in the group [Bach]
What a pronoun like 'he' refers back to is usually a matter of speaker's intentions [Bach]
Information comes from knowing who is speaking, not just from interpretation of the utterance [Bach]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
The standard aim of semantics is to assign a semantic value to each expression [Fine,K]
That two utterances say the same thing may not be intrinsic to them, but involve their relationships [Fine,K]
The two main theories are Holism (which is inferential), and Representational (which is atomistic) [Fine,K]
We should pursue semantic facts as stated by truths in theories (and not put the theories first!) [Fine,K]
Referentialist semantics has objects for names, properties for predicates, and propositions for connectives [Fine,K]
Fregeans approach the world through sense, Referentialists through reference [Fine,K]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
I take indexicals such as 'this' and 'that' to be linked to some associated demonstration [Fine,K]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
People slide from contextual variability all the way to contextual determination [Bach]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / a. Idealistic ethics
Beauty, goodness and truth are only achieved by applying full attention [Weil]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
The good is a nothingness, and yet real [Weil]
There are two goods - the absolute good we want, and the reachable opposite of evil [Weil]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 1. Social Power
The essence of power is illusory prestige [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 1. Ideology
A group is only dangerous if it endorses an abstract entity [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 2. Anarchism
Our only social duty is to try to limit evil [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 9. Communism
The collective is the one and only object of false idolatry [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 14. Nationalism
Charity is the only love, and you can feel that for a country (a place with traditions), but not a nation [Weil]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
If effort is from necessity rather than for a good, it is slavery [Weil]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
The soul is the intrinsic value of a human [Weil]