Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Guide to Ground', 'Philosophical Fragments' and 'Three Grades of Modal Involvement'

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28 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
Realist metaphysics concerns what is real; naive metaphysics concerns natures of things [Fine,K]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
Truths need not always have their source in what exists [Fine,K]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 7. Making Modal Truths
If the truth-making relation is modal, then modal truths will be grounded in anything [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
Logical consequence is verification by a possible world within a truth-set [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
Whether a modal claim is true depends on how the object is described [Quine, by Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
Objects are the values of variables, so a referentially opaque context cannot be quantified into [Quine]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
I assume existence, rather than reasoning towards it [Kierkegaard]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
2+2=4 is necessary if it is snowing, but not true in virtue of the fact that it is snowing [Fine,K]
If you say one thing causes another, that leaves open that the 'other' has its own distinct reality [Fine,K]
An immediate ground is the next lower level, which gives the concept of a hierarchy [Fine,K]
'Strict' ground moves down the explanations, but 'weak' ground can move sideways [Fine,K]
We learn grounding from what is grounded, not what does the grounding [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
If grounding is a relation it must be between entities of the same type, preferably between facts [Fine,K]
Ground is best understood as a sentence operator, rather than a relation between predicates [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation
Only metaphysical grounding must be explained by essence [Fine,K]
Philosophical explanation is largely by ground (just as cause is used in science) [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / d. Grounding and reduction
We can only explain how a reduction is possible if we accept the concept of ground [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
Facts, such as redness and roundness of a ball, can be 'fused' into one fact [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Aristotelian essentialism says a thing has some necessary and some non-necessary properties [Quine]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
Even a three-dimensionalist might identify temporal parts, in their thinking [Fine,K]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Nothing necessary can come into existence, since it already 'is' [Kierkegaard]
Necessity can attach to statement-names, to statements, and to open sentences [Quine]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
Necessity is in the way in which we say things, and not things themselves [Quine]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
Each basic modality has its 'own' explanatory relation [Fine,K]
Every necessary truth is grounded in the nature of something [Fine,K]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
We explain by identity (what it is), or by truth (how things are) [Fine,K]
Is there metaphysical explanation (as well as causal), involving a constitutive form of determination? [Fine,K]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
If mind supervenes on the physical, it may also explain the physical (and not vice versa) [Fine,K]