13 ideas
| 10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
| 6299 | Axioms are often affirmed simply because they produce results which have been accepted [Resnik] |
| 6304 | Mathematical realism says that maths exists, is largely true, and is independent of proofs [Resnik] |
| 10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
| 10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
| 6300 | Mathematical constants and quantifiers only exist as locations within structures or patterns [Resnik] |
| 6303 | Sets are positions in patterns [Resnik] |
| 6295 | There are too many mathematical objects for them all to be mental or physical [Resnik] |
| 6296 | Maths is pattern recognition and representation, and its truth and proofs are based on these [Resnik] |
| 6301 | Congruence is the strongest relationship of patterns, equivalence comes next, and mutual occurrence is the weakest [Resnik] |
| 6302 | Structuralism must explain why a triangle is a whole, and not a random set of points [Resnik] |
| 4242 | Pure supervenience explains nothing, and is a sign of something fundamental we don't know [Nagel] |
| 10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |