16 ideas
| 3269 | If your life is to be meaningful as part of some large thing, the large thing must be meaningful [Nagel] |
| 10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
| 16951 | It was realised that possible worlds covered all modal logics, if they had a structure [Dummett] |
| 16953 | Relative possibility one way may be impossible coming back, so it isn't symmetrical [Dummett] |
| 16952 | If something is only possible relative to another possibility, the possibility relation is not transitive [Dummett] |
| 16960 | If possibilitiy is relative, that might make accessibility non-transitive, and T the correct system [Dummett] |
| 16958 | In S4 the actual world has a special place [Dummett] |
| 10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
| 10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
| 16957 | Possible worlds aren't how the world might be, but how a world might be, given some possibility [Dummett] |
| 16959 | If possible worlds have no structure (S5) they are equal, and it is hard to deny them reality [Dummett] |
| 3270 | Justifications come to an end when we want them to [Nagel] |
| 10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |
| 16956 | To explain generosity in a person, you must understand a generous action [Dummett] |
| 3268 | If a small brief life is absurd, then so is a long and large one [Nagel] |
| 16954 | Generalised talk of 'natural kinds' is unfortunate, as they vary too much [Dummett] |